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Abstract
This article describes citizen activism about the situation in Darfur. Part I describes the birth
of the activist movement. Part II describes the foundations and growth of the movement. Part
III describes the movement in more detail and details govenrment responses as a result of this
movement. Parts IV and V look towards the future.
ACTIVISM AND DARFUR:
SLOWLY DRIVING POLICY CHANGE
Colin Thomas-Jensen* &Julia Spiegel**
After more than four years of unrelenting violence in Dar-
fur and eastern Chad, and faced with overwhelming suffering, it
can be easier to quantify rather than qualify the nature of what is
occurring. At least 200,000 people are dead and 2.5 million peo-
ple are displaced in this isolated pocket of Africa.1 But consider
these statistics in a more familiar context: imagine every resi-
dent of New Orleans wiped off the map. Or picture the popula-
tion of Houston, the United States' fourth largest city, living in
refugee camps, sleeping in makeshift shelters made of plastic
sheeting, and subsisting on international handouts-some for
more than four years.
The basic synopsis of what has happened in Darfur is well
known. In mid-2003, the government of Sudan responded to a
rebel insurgency by arming, training, and unleashing ethnically-
based militias known as theJanjaweed to kill, rape, displace, and
loot civilians with impunity.2 The government systematically
targeted specific ethnic groups-the Fur, Zaghawa, and Mas-
saleit-and sought to create conditions on the ground that
would slowly destroy a way of life that has existed for centuries. 3
Unlike the Rwanda genocide ten years earlier, where the
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1. See U.N. Chief Visits Sudan to Prepare Ground for Darfur Relief Mission, INDEPENDENT
(London), Sept. 3, 2007, at 20.
2. See Sandeep Gopalan, From Darfur to Sinai to Kashmir: Ethno-Religious Conflicts and
Legalization, 55 BUFF. L. REv. 403, 432-33 (2007).
3. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, TARGETING THE FUR: MASS KILLINGS IN DARFUR 3
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slaughter was committed in the short span of one hundred days,
the genocide in Darfur has unfolded over many months and has
been well-documented by human rights organizations, humani-
tarian workers, and journalists. 4 In the wake of Rwanda, the in-
ternational community focused on so-called "early warning"
mechanisms-tools with which to identify nascent crises before
they become full-blown catastrophes.5 For Darfur, early warning
worked-non-governmental organizations in particular identi-
fied the crisis early, provided clear policy prescriptions, and ad-
vocated them directly to policymakers and through the media.6
However, the optimistic notion that an early warning would be
heeded-and effective action taken-is seriously misguided.
Like Rwanda, genocide in Darfur and the international
community's feckless response could have generated a profound
sense of hopelessness and apathy among Americans, but it did
not. Americans from all walks of life have recognized a shared
humanity with the people of Darfur and are taking concrete
(2005), available at http://www.hrw.org/backgrounder/africa/darfur0105/darfur0105.
pdf.
4. See MICHAEL CLOUGH, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, DARFUR: WHOSE RESPONSIBILITY
TO PROTECT? 1 (2005), available at http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php?
module=uploads&func=download&fileld=42 (discussing how United Nations ("U.N.")
Member States responded to rising human rights abuses in Darfur with humanitarian
action, missions, calls for negotiations and other types of assistance); Ernest Harsch,
Preventing Genocide: From Rhetoric to Action: U.N. Special Adviser Urges Firm Measures
Against Darfur Slaughter, 20 AR. RENEWAL 3 (2006), available at www.un.org/ecosocdev/
geninfo/afrec/vol20nol/AR-April-2006.pdf (comparing responses by U.N. to geno-
cides in Sudan and Rwanda). The Darfur crisis has also been the focus of considerable
attention and advocacy efforts by numerous human rights organizations, such as the
Save Darfur Coalition and its organizational members. See generally Save Darfur, http://
www.savedarfur.org (last visited Apr. 29, 2008).
5. See Harsch, supra note 4 (outlining U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan's 2004
plan of action to prevent future genocides, which involved four main areas of activity:
preventing armed conflict, protecting civilians, ending impunity, and ensuring early
warnings and swift action).
6. In June 2003, for example, the International Crisis Group published a report
stating that:
The nascent armed rebellion in Darfur, now at risk of escalation, has shocked
much of Sudan. The concerns of communities in this region-particularly the
Fur, Zaghawa, Massaleit, and other African peoples of western Sudan-mirror
not only the situation in the Three Areas and the South, but also that of the
Beja in eastern Sudan and the Nubians in northern Sudan. A threatened mas-
sive military response by the government in Darfur would take a tremendous
toll on the civilian population while only deepening resentment.
INT'L CRISIS GROUP, AFI'cA REPORT No. 14: SUDAN'S OTHER WARS 1 (2003), available at
http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=1808&1=1.
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steps to end the killing and press for lasting peace in all of Su-
dan.7 Indeed, the correlation between citizen activism and U.S.
action is striking. Most of the measures that elected officials
have taken-both the Bush Administration and members of
Congress-have come as a direct result of mounting pressure
from American citizens.8 The louder activists get, the greater
the political cost for failing to act. Make no mistake, activism is
making a difference for Darfur, and strengthening the growing
Darfur constituency should be a priority for anyone who cares
about how the United States responds when genocide and
crimes against humanity occur anywhere in the world.
I. THE BIRTH OF A MOVEMENT
The significant disconnect between political rhetoric and in-
ternational action gave rise to a groundswell of frustration in the
United States and around the world from those expecting a
more robust international response to the crisis in Darfur. In
the United States, one of the key triggers came on September 9,
2004, when then Secretary of State Colin L. Powell, speaking
before the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, declared
that the atrocities in Darfur constituted genocide.9
Lawyers at the U.S. State Department made this legal deter-
mination following a State Department investigation in eastern
Chad, where researchers conducted interviews with 1,136 recent
refugees from Darfur."° The refugees had fled the initial on-
slaught of the Sudanese military andJanjaweed militias, and tes-
tified to their experience during the attacks. Having assessed
the State Department's data and consulting with State Depart-
ment lawyers, Powell stated: "[W] e concluded, I concluded, that
genocide has been committed in Darfur and that the Govern-
7. See Richard Allen Greene, Americans Take Up Darfur's Cause, BBC NEWS, Nov. 20,
2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/6156610.stm.
8. See CLOUGH, supra note 4, at 7 (discussing the role of the United States in Darfur
and the belief that the Bush Administration made ending the Sudanese civil war a top
foreign policy priority in 2001-2002 due to pressure from conservative religious activ-
ists).
9. See Current Situation in Sudan and Prospects for Peace: Hearing Before the S. Foreign
Relations Comm., 108th Cong. (2004) (statement of Colin L. Powell, Sec'y of State of the
United States) [hereinafter Hearing on Situation in Sudan].
10. See generally BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, & LABOR & BUREAU OF
INTELLIGENCE & RESEARCH, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, DOCUMENTING ATROCITIES IN DARFUR
(2004).
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ment of Sudan and the Janjaweed] bear responsibility-and ge-
nocide may still be occurring.""
Powell thus became the first U.S. government official to de-
clare that genocide had indeed been occurring in Darfur, and
the first U.S. official in history to make a genocide determina-
tion while atrocities were ongoing.'2 Although estimates vary, ex-
perts agree that hundreds of thousands have been killed in Dar-
fur, 2.5 million-approximately one-third of Darfur's entire pop-
ulation-remain internally displaced, and another 235,000 live
as refugees in camps in eastern Chad. 3
Powell's public pronouncement immediately raised the pro-
file of the conflict in Darfur and with it an expectation that, as
per Article 1 of the Convention on the Prevention and Punish-
ment of the Crime of Genocide, that the invocation of the term
would trigger additional actions by the U.S. government (and,
perhaps, other nations and international bodies around the
world) "to prevent and to punish."' 4 That was, after all, the pur-
pose of Raphael Lemkin's lifelong struggle to coin a term that
would define this most heinous of crimes against humanity.' 5
But Powell qualified his words in that same testimony, stating:
Mr. Chairman, some seem to have been waiting for this deter-
mination of genocide to take action. In fact, however, no new
action is dictated by this determination. We have been doing
everything we can to get the Sudanese government to act
responsibly. So let us not be too preoccupied with this desig-
nation.16
With those words, a movement was born. The notion that
11. Hearing on Situation in Sudan, supra note 9.
12. See Scott Straus, Darfur and the Genocide Debate, 84 FOREIGN AFF. 123, 123 (2005).
13. See Alfred de Montesquiou, African Union Force Ineffective, Complain Refugees in
Darfur, WASH. POST, Oct. 16, 2006, at A15 (reporting that 2.5 million people are inter-
nally displaced in Sudan); see also Department for International Development, Humani-
tarian Update-July 2007: Chad, http://www.dfid.gov.uk/emergencies/humanitarian_
update.asp#Chad (last visited Apr. 29, 2008) (noting that there are over 235,000 Darfur
refugees in Eastern Chad).
14. Article 1 of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide
reads: "The Contracting Parties confirm that genocide, whether committed in time of
peace or in time of war, is a crime under international law which they undertake to
prevent and to punish." Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide art. 1, Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277, 280.
15. See SAMANTHA POWER, "A PROBLEM FROM HELL": AMERICA AND THE AGE OF GE-
NOCIDE 17-30 (2002).
16. Hearing on Situation in Sudan, supra note 9.
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Powell and others within the U.S. government could on the one
hand acknowledge that genocide was taking place, and on the
other, reject the notion that greater action therefore was war-
ranted, ignited a moral outrage across the United States and be-
yond.
II. THE FOUNDATIONS OF A MOVEMENT
As the situation on the ground in Darfur worsened, public
frustration fueled what was then a budding grassroots move-
ment-based largely in the United States but increasingly active
in other parts of the world-of citizens pressing for a more ro-
bust political response from the world's leaders. The movement
had a theoretical and intellectual underpinning in two sources:
an emerging doctrine called the "responsibility to protect" and a
Pulitzer Prize winning examination of how the United States re-
sponded to genocide throughout the twentieth century.
17
The responsibility to protect emerged in the aftermath of
mass atrocities in Rwanda, Bosnia and Kosovo, crises which
sparked a heated controversy between supporters of a "right of
humanitarian intervention" and those who argued that state sov-
ereignty, as recognized in the United Nations ("U.N.") Charter,
precluded any intervention in the internal affairs of a country.18
The responsibility to protect, initially formulated in a 2001 re-
port by the International Commission on Intervention and State
Sovereignty ("ICISS"), aimed at bridging this divide between
those in favor of humanitarian intervention and those who be-
lieved sovereignty remained paramount.19
The responsibility to protect essentially argues that sover-
eign states, and the international community as a whole, have a
responsibility to protect civilians from mass atrocity crimes. If a
government is unable or unwilling to ensure the security of its
own people, regional states and the international community
therefore bear responsibility for protecting those civilians. 20 Fur-
17. See generally POWER, supra note 15.
18. See, e.g., Carsten Stahn, Responsibility to Protect: Political Rhetoric or Emerging Legal
Norm, 101 AM. J. INT'L L. 99 (2007).
19. INT'L COMM'N ON INTERVENTION & STATE SOVEREIGNTY [ICISS], THE RESPONSI-
BILITY TO PROTECT: REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON INTERVENTION AND
STATE SOVEREIGNTY (2001) [hereinafter ICISS REPORT], available at http://www.iciss.ca/
pdf/Commission-Report.pdf.
20. See generally Stahn, supra note 18.
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ther, the doctrine defines this responsibility more broadly than
the simplistic (and inherently divisive) question of whether or
not to intervene militarily to prevent crimes against humanity. 21
The three international responsibilities are the following:
1. The responsibility to prevent: To address both the root
causes and direct causes of internal conflict and other
man-made crises putting populations at risk.
2. The responsibility to react: To respond to situations of com-
pelling human need with appropriate measures, which
may include coercive measures like sanctions and inter-
national prosecution, and in extreme cases military inter-
vention.
3. The responsibility to rebuild: To provide, particularly after a
military intervention, full assistance with recovery, recon-
struction and reconciliation, addressing the causes of the
harm the intervention was designed to halt or avert.22
By adopting the responsibility to protect as a platform from
which to address the difficult question of exactly how the interna-
tional community should respond to the crisis in Darfur, activists
established themselves at the forefront of a broader movement
to prevent genocide and crimes against humanity wherever they
occur. Moreover, Darfur activists avoided the potentially fatal
trap of arguing for military intervention as the only way to pre-
vent atrocities and protect civilians; no credible activist voice has
pressed for a non-consensual military intervention in Darfur.23
The second intellectual leg that the Darfur activist move-
21. See ICISS REPORT, supra note 19, at 17-18.
22. Id. Just a few years after the ICISS Report, the responsibility to protect became
a central theme in the Secretary-General's recommendations to the U.N. See The Secre-
tary-General, In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All,
U.N. Doc. A/59/2005 (Mar. 21 2005); The Secretary General, High-Level Panel on
Threats, Challenges and Change, A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility, deliv-
ered to the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/59/565 (Dec. 2, 2004). The report In
Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All was unanimously
accepted by Heads of State and Government at the September 2005 World Summit
session of the U.N. General Assembly.
23. See INT'L CRISIS GROUP, A STRATEGY FOR COMPREHENSIVE PEACE IN SUDAN 13-15
(2007) (outlining various international strategy objectives for Darfur), available at
http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/africa/horn-of-africa/ I 30_a.strategy
-for.comprehensivepeace in-sudan.pdf; see alsOJOHN PRENDERGAST & COLIN THONAS-
JENSEN, ENOUGH: AN Axis OF PEACE FOR DARFUR: THE UNITED STATES, FRANCE, AND
CHINA 4-5 (June 2007), available at http://www.enoughproject.org/files/reports/
axis-of.peace-paper.pdf (promoting the "3Ps" crisis response framework of peacekeep-
ing, protection, and punishment over non-consensual military intervention in Darfur).
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ment stands on is the thesis put forward in Samantha Power's
2003 book A Problem From Hell: America and the Age of Genocide.2 4
Power forcefully and convincingly argues that the U.S. govern-
ment has failed to respond aggressively to genocide throughout
the twentieth century-from the Turkish genocide of Armenians
to the tragedies of the Balkans and Rwanda in the 1990s-be-
cause there has not been an effective political cost for inaction.25
Policymakers are stirred to action by a compelling national inter-
est or domestic political considerations, and in the absence of
either, as was the case most vividly and dreadfully in Rwanda, the
U.S. government simply will not make full use of all of its capa-
bilities-diplomatic or military-to stop crimes against humanity
or genocide. The Darfur activist movement is a response to this
basic dilemma, and, as discussed below, focused activism is af-
fecting policy change.
III. THE GROWTH OF A MOVEMENT
Over the last five years, what started as a few students, relig-
ious leaders, and members of Congress has grown into a broad-
based nationwide campaign on Darfur.26 People with diverse po-
litical, religious, cultural and ethnic affiliations have joined to-
gether in an effort to end the Darfur crisis.27 One of the greatest
driving forces has been the student movement, or STAND,28
which formed at Georgetown University in 2004, just a few weeks
after President George W. Bush called Darfur "genocide," and
one year after the fighting broke out in Darfur. Since then, it
has grown into an international network of student activists, with
over 700 chapters around the world.
The Save Darfur Coalition,29 formed in mid-2004, is an alli-
ance of more than 180 faith-based advocacy and human rights
organizations with more than one-million activists and 1000
community groups working to end the atrocities in Darfur.
24. See generally POWER, supra note 15.
25. See id. at 503-10.
26. See JOHN PRENDERGAST ET AL., ENOUGH, DON'T QUIT Now: BRINGING THE
DARFUR GENOCIDE TO AN END 1 (2007), available at http://www.enoughproject.org/
files/reports/dontquitb_20071203.pdf.
27. See id.
28. For more information, see STAND-A Student Anti-Genocide Coalition,
http://www.standnow.org (last visited Feb. 7, 2008).
29. For more information see Save Darfur, http://www.SaveDarfur.org (last visited
Apr. 29, 2008).
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Other groups such as ENOUGH, the Genocide Intervention
Network and the Sudan Divestment Task Force3 ° have also been
collaborating to educate a growing number of Americans about
the issue and promote practical policy solutions to the crisis in
Darfur.
The movement is not confined to the United States. Citi-
zens around the world have helped to galvanize a number of key
international players-most prominently China, France, and
Great Britain-to play more assertive and collaborative roles in
finding a resolution to the Darfur crisis. 1
China has a strong tradition of not interfering in the domes-
tic politics of any country, particularly those in which it has deep
economic ties, such as Sudan. Yet advocacy campaigns based in
the United States and Europe have successfully pressured China
to play a more constructive role vis-a-vis Sudan.3 2 The global
campaign to tie the Chinese government and its multi-billion
dollar investments in the Sudanese oil sector to the atrocities in
Darfur has reverberated in Beijing. Recently, Dream for Dar-
fur-a leading activist group bringing pressure to bear on
China-issued a report that grades sponsors of the 2008 Olym-
pics in Beijing on what actions they have taken to approach
China over its role in Darfur.3 3 This public name-and-shame, as
well as other activist and celebrity pressure (including Stephen
Spielberg, who recently resigned as artistic adviser for the 2008
Beijing Olympic Games' opening ceremonies) 4 on the Chinese
government in relation to the upcoming Olympic Games, drove
the Beijing government to play a much more active behind-the-
scenes role in pressing the Sudanese government to comply with
its international obligations. China's quiet pressure on the Khar-
toum regime, for example, led Sudan to officially accept a joint
30. For more information on these groups, please see their respective websites. See
Enough, The Project to End Genocide and Crimes Against Humanity, http://www.
enoughproject.org (last visited Apr. 29, 2008); Genocide Intervention Network, http://
www.genocideintervention.net (last visited Apr. 29, 2008); Sudan Divestment Task
Force, http://www.sudandivestment.org (last visited Apr. 29, 2008).
31. See PRENDERGAST ET AL., supra note 26, at 2.
32. See id.
33. See Olympic Dream for Darfur, http://www.dreamfordarfur.org/ (last visited
Feb. 7, 2008); see also PRENDERGAST ET AL., supra note 26, at 2.
34. See James Bone, Spielberg Pulls Out of Olympics in Protest at China's Policy on Dar-
fur, TImEs (London), Feb. 13, 2008, at 3.
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African Union ("A.U.")/U.N. peacekeeping force for Darfur.35
As a result of pressure from their citizens, the French and
British Governments have also taken more diplomatic action on
the Darfur crisis. The French pressure group Urgence Darfour
worked tirelessly to put Darfur on the agenda for candidates in
France's most recent presidential election. 6 Upon taking office
in May 2007, French President Nicolas Sarkozy promptly
pledged to work to bring the Darfur crisis to an end, convened a
ministerial summit to discuss a coordinated international ap-
proach, and sent his foreign minister to the region to break the
impasse over separate peacekeeping deployments to Darfur and
eastern Chad. France will now spearhead the deployment of a
joint U.N.-European Union ("E.U.") mission to protect civilians
and humanitarians in eastern Chad. In Great Britain, activists
led by organizations such as Aegis Trust and Crisis Action have
put pressure on former British Prime Minister Tony Blair and
his successor Gordon Brown to take a leading role in interna-
tional efforts on Darfur.17 Shortly after Brown took office, he
and Sarkozy penned a joint opinion piece in The Times of
London underscoring their commitment to the issue and outlin-
ing steps they plan to take jointly to press for a solution."s
In the United States, as outlined below, both the legislative
and executive branches have taken action in the past three years
35. PRENDERGAST ET AL., supra note 26, at 2. Unfortunately, China has not sus-
tained that pressure and the Sudanese government continues to erect bureaucratic
roadblocks to the force's full deployment. See id.
36. See generally Collectif Urgence Darfour, http://www.urgencedarfour.info/ (last
visited Apr. 29, 2008).
37. See CRISIS ACTION, REPORT ON RECENT ACTIVITIES (JuLY-SEPT. 2006) with Ac-
counts 2005-2006, at 4 (2006), available at http://crisisaction.org/docs/Quarterly%20
Report.pdf; James Smith, Yes, There Really is a Way to Help Darfur, TIMES (London), Dec.
9, 2006, at 23 (pressuring Prime Minister Blair to act on his words and have Great
Britain assist in Darfur); Aegis Trust, Darfur (Sept. 17, 2007), http://www.aegistrust.
org/index. php?option=comconten t&task=view&id= 175&Itemid= 183 (praising
Gordon Brown for his involvement in Darfur, but reiterating there is still work for him
to do); Aegis Trust, Worldwide Protests Demand Action to Protect Darfur (Sept. 17,
2007), http://www.aegistrust.org/index.php?option=comcontent&task=view&id=665
&Itemid=88 (discussing how Gordon Brown is committed to solving the Darfur crisis);
James Smith, Aegis Trust, Blair Statement on Darfur: Too Many Words, Too Little Ac-
tion (Dec. 09, 2006), http://www.aegistrust.org/index.php?option=comcontent&task=
view&id=555&Itemid=88 (calling for Prime Minister Blair to take action in the Darfur
crisis).
38. See Gordon Brown & Nicolas Sarkozy, We are Pushing and Pushing to Save the
Darfuris, TIMES (London), Aug. 31, 2007, at 19.
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as a direct result of pressure from U.S. citizens. Although most
within the movement have never been to Darfur-most have
never even met a person from Darfur-they write letters, partici-
pate in demonstrations, and become what Samantha Power
terms "upstanders" in the face of the most horrific crimes against
humanity. 9 Over the last four years, this movement has become
a formidable force for change in helping to press U.S. leader-
ship to aggressively pursue a three-pronged multilateral ap-
proach to end the Darfur crisis: serious peace negotiations, pro-
tection of innocent civilians, and accountability for those most
responsible for crimes against humanity.40
A. Negotiating Peace
In the summer of 2006, activists and key leaders within the
U.S. Congress finally succeeded in pressing the White House to
appoint a Special Envoy for Sudan, Andrew Natsios, to be the
point-person for U.S. efforts on Darfur.4 After a false start in
early November 2007, following a failed peace agreement signed
in May 2006, the mediators are making adjustments and assess-
ing options for a more effective approach, and activists have
maintained the steady drumbeat of support for a credible peace
process in Darfur.42 Beijing has appointed an experienced dip-
lomat in Africa, Liu Giujin, as its special envoy to Darfur, despite
its general distaste for envoys of this nature." This decision was
almost certainly a result of global activist pressure. Since assum-
ing his post in May, Liu has visited Sudan several times and trav-
eled to Sirte, Libya, for the peace talks.
In a related move, activists and their congressional allies
also pressured the United States to name an envoy to support
39. See generally POWER, supra note 15.
40. See ROGER WINTER & JOHN PRENDERGAST, ENOUGH, AN ALL-SUDAN SOLUTION:
LINKING DARFUR AND THE SOUTH 6 (2007), available at http://www.enoughproject.org/
files/reports/allsudan-20071114.pdf.
41. See Press Release, Sean McCormack, U.S. Dep't of State, Appointment of An-
drew Natsios as the President's Special Envoy for Sudan (Sept. 19, 2006), available at
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2006/72830.htm).
42. See COLIN THOMAS-JENSEN & JOHN PRENDERGAST, ENOUGH, A STRATEGY FOR
SUCCESS IN SIRTE 1 (2007), available at http://www.enoughproject.org/files/reports/
sirte%20finall.pdf.
43. See China appoints envoy for Darfur, BBC NEWS, May 10, 2007, http://news.bbc
.co.uk/2/hi/africa/6641929.stm.
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peace negotiations to end the conflict in northern Uganda."
Activists are also beginning to develop important ties between
the Darfur movement and the constituencies that helped to fo-
cus U.S. government attention on implementing Sudan's 2005
Comprehensive Peace Agreement ("CPA"), a U.S.-backed deal
that halted the destructive war that raged through Southern Su-
dan from 1983, killing two million and displacing nearly five mil-
lion more.
B. Protecting Civilians
In July 2007, the U.N. Security Council unanimously author-
ized the deployment of an A.U./U.N. hybrid force for Darfur,
known as UNAMID, and the Sudanese regime accepted.4" This
was an extraordinary accomplishment, brought about in part be-
cause of global activist efforts in countries throughout the world,
including the thirty-five countries that held "Global Day for Dar-
fur" rallies in the spring of 2007.46 Steady pressure from activist
organizations has also helped keep funding available for the Af-
rican Union Mission in Sudan ("AMIS") (though it must be
noted that the United States and others have failed miserably to
endow AMIS with the capabilities to fulfill its mandate).
C. Promoting Accountability
Activist pressure also resulted in the United States stepping
aside and allowing the U.N. Security Council to pass a resolution
referring select participants in the atrocities in Darfur to the In-
ternational Criminal Court ("ICC"). 4 7 This resolution gave the
ICC authority to investigate and prosecute those most responsi-
ble for human rights violations committed in Darfur. Addition-
ally, the Bush administration responded to intense congressional
and activist pressure by expanding sanctions on transactions in-
volving the Sudanese oil sector, signaling that the protracted pe-
44. The Ugandan rebel Lord's Resistance Army has, like thejanjaweed, committed
serious atrocities against civilians and served as a proxy for Khartoum. See generally JOHN
PRENDERGAST, ENOUGH, WHAT TO Do ABOUTJOSEPH KONT (2007), available at http://
www.enoughproject.org/files/reports/kony-20071029.pdf.
45. See S.C. Res. 1769, 9 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1769 (July 31, 2007); see also U.N.
DEP'T OF PUBLIC INFO., PEACE & SEC. SECTION, UNITED NATIONS AND DARFUR FACT SHEET
(2007), available at http://www.un.org/News/dh/infocus/sudan/fact-sheet.pdf.
46. See World Rallies forDarfur Action, BBC NEWS, Apr. 29, 2007, http://news.bbc.co.
uk/2/hi/africa/6604555.stm.
47. See S.C. Res. 1593, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1593 (Mar. 31, 2005).
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riod of "all bark and no bite" was over for U.S. policy toward
Darfur. 48 Although these sanctions must become multilateral
through the U.N. Security Council to be maximally effective, the
U.S. government's measures are a step in the right direction.
These expanded sanctions were announced shortly after Darfur
activists in the United States participated in over 450 "Global
Days for Darfur" events in forty-seven states, calling for action to
stop the genocide.49
Activists have also effected policy change within state gov-
ernments, universities, and private companies. The Sudan Di-
vestment Taskforce has spearheaded the most effective divest-
ment campaign since the anti-apartheid divestment movement
aimed at South Africa in the 1980s and early 1990s.5" The efforts
have targeted endowments, public pensions, and mutual funds
that indirectly benefit from genocide. Twenty-two U.S. states-
both large and small-have divested thus far. Fifty-eight univer-
sities have divested, and forty-seven more have active ongoing
campaigns aimed at cleaning their endowments of stocks under-
writing genocidal policies; fifteen countries have initiated
targeted Sudan divestment campaigns; 5' and Fidelity, one of the
largest mutual fund companies in the United States, has sold
more than ninety percent of its holdings in PetroChina, an oil
sector company with close ties to the Sudanese government, in
response to a major activist campaign.52
48. See PRENDERGAST ET AL., supra note 26, at 3; see also Kirit Radia, Bush Announces
More Sanctions for Sudan, ABC NEWS, May 29, 2007, http://abcnews.go.com/US/story?id
=3220915.
49. See JOHN PRENDERGAST ET AL., supra note 26, at 3; Press Release, Save Darfur
Coal., Peace and Protection for Darfur Civilians Urged at over 500 U.S. Events as Part of
"Global Days" (May 4, 2007), available at http://www.savedarfur.org/newsroom/
releases/peaceand.protection-fordarfur civilians.urged-at-over 500_us events-as_
pa/.
50. See JOHN PRENDERGAST ET AL., supra note 26, at 3; see also Martin Plaut, Darfur
Campaign Cuts Sudan Money, BBC NEWS (U.K.), Oct. 7, 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/
hi/africa/5416272.stm (stating that "[tihe campaign is run by the Sudan Divestment
Task Force" and "[i] t is beginning to gain the kind of momentum it took anti-apartheid
pressure groups 20 years to achieve"). For further information on the Sudan Divest-
ment Task Force, see Sudan Divestment Task Force, http://www.sudandivestment.org/
home.asp (last visited Apr. 29, 2008).
51. The countries are: Australia, Belgium, Canada, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan,
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, South Africa, Sweden, Switzerland, the United
Kingdom, and the United States. See Sudan Divestment Task Force, Divestment Statis-
tics, http://www.sudandivestment.org/statistics.asp (last visited Apr. 29, 2008).
52. See Muralikumar Anantharaman, Fidelity's PetroChina Stake Sale Shows Campaign
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Warren Buffet's Berkshire Hathaway followed suit after be-
ing targeted at his shareholder meeting, selling one hundred
percent of his PetroChina holdings.5' Following weeks of en-
gagement with the Sudan Divestment Taskforce, La Mancha Re-
sources, a Canadian mining company and the primary foreign
player in Sudan's mineral extraction industry, committed to re-
frain from new investment in Sudan until a peacekeeping force
consistent with U.N. Security Council Resolution 1769 has been
deployed in Darfur with the full compliance and cooperation of
the Sudanese government-even though all of its operations are
on the opposite side of Sudan.54 In addition, the company's
president met with Dr. Awad Ahmed al Jaz, Sudan's Minister of
Energy and Mining, to discuss Darfur and encourage the Suda-
nese government to allow deployment of the U.N.-led
peacekeeping force. 5
Divestment efforts are coming full circle, as well. The U.S.
Congress is nearing passage of the Sudan Accountability and Di-
vestment Act,56 a vehicle for getting foreign companies operat-
ing in Sudan to suspend or change their Sudanese business op-
erations or risk losing their contracts with the U.S. government.
The cumulative effects of these divestment efforts are political as
much as economic, as it casts Sudan and the companies that sup-
Power, REUTERS, May 23, 2007, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/reuters
Edge/idUSN2325531920070523. But see Ross Kerber, Fidelity Says it Did Not Divest for
Darfur, BOSTON GLOBE, May 17, 2007, at Dl.
53. See Buffet Says Berkshire Hathaway Has Sold Last of PetroChina Shares, INT'L HER
ALD TRIB., Oct. 18, 2007, available at http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2007/10/18/
business/NA-FIN-US-Berkshire-PetroChina.php.
54. See Combating Genocide in Darfur-The Role of Divestment and Other Policy Tools:
Hearing Before the S. Committee on Banking, Housing, & Urban Affairs, 110th Cong. (2007)
(statement of Adam Sterling, Director, Sudan Divestment Task Force), available athttp://banking.senate.gov/jfiles/sterling.pdf; see also LA MANCHA RESOURCES INC., POL-
ICY ON ONGOING OPERATIONS AND INVESTMENT IN SUDAN (2007), available at http://www.
lamancharesources.com/2/Sudan%2Policy%20-%20vl 1-v2.pdf.
55. For more information on La Mancha Resource's divestment actions, see Com-
bating Genocide in Darfur-The Role of Divestment and Other Policy Tools, supra note 54.
56. The U.S. Senate passed the bill by unanimous consent on December 12, 2007,
and the House of Representatives is expected to quickly pass the Senate version of the
bill. President Bush and his administration, however, have strongly opposed this legisla-
tion to date, arguing that now is not the right time to pressure the Sudanese govern-
ment and that the bill would interfere with presidential foreign policy. See Susan




port it as pariahs that must change their behavior or be denied
international investment capital.
IV. TOWARD A PERMANENT CONSTITUENCY
Although the Darfur advocacy movement has made com-
mendable strides, the large disconnect between the moral im-
perative in Darfur and the action needed to resolve the crisis
remains. This not only involves pressing for a more robust diplo-
matic response today, but investing in institutional development
to more effectively prevent similar atrocities from unfolding in
the future. Ultimately, the movement needs to build a broad-
based permanent constituency of citizens pressing for an end to
genocide and crimes against humanity. After the Holocaust,
Rwanda, and Srebenica, small waves of advocacy efforts came
and went, but each time, activists had to reinvent the wheel. The
current movement, which is far stronger and broader than any
of its predecessors, has the opportunity to make this a perma-
nent effort to not only respond to Darfur and other similarly
egregious crises, but to build institutional capacity and will to
prevent future outbreaks of mass atrocities.
V. THE WAY FORWARD
In the current struggle regarding the situation in Darfur,
activists have played a critical role in helping to change or influ-
ence a number of the key policies that are critical prerequisites
for ending the crisis in Darfur in the areas of peace, protection,
and punishment. Yet serious challenges and obstacles remain.
First and foremost, China, France, Great Britain and the United
States must do much more diplomatically to pressure the Suda-
nese government to stop undermining domestic and interna-
tional efforts to pursue peace and protection in Darfur. Again, a
few steps have been made in the right direction, but these four
key countries have not put Darfur center stage; not unilaterally,
not through regional partnerships, and not at the United Na-
tions Security Council, where it arguably matters most.
Secondly, on peace: to create the missing and essential
point of coordinated leverage on the parties involved in peace
efforts, the United States, with full-backing from the White
House, must establish a full-time diplomatic team in the region,
headed by the White House envoy, with two deputies-one for
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Darfur and one for the South-to maintain consistent, high-
level pressure on implementation of the CPA and driving for-
ward a peace process for Darfur. The United States must enlist
similar commitments from its allies-especially the United King-
dom and France-as well as China to demonstrate international
consensus and commitment for a peaceful political transition in
Sudan.
Third, on protection: the United States should work with
the E.U., U.N. and A.U. to ensure the deployment of the civilian
protection force for Darfur authorized by Security Council Reso-
lution 1769 and the E.U. force set to deploy to eastern Chad.
The Permanent members of the U.N. Security Council must
demonstrate their commitment by devoting air assets and pro-
viding operation support for UNAMID. A similar effort is
needed to support the E.U.'s force in Chad to ensure that the
force has the capacity to respond quickly and effectively to at-
tacks against civilians.
Fourth, on punishment: to build leverage for peace and
protection, it is crucial that any party who undermines efforts to
promote peace and protect civilians face repercussions. Specifi-
cally, the United States, France and the United Kingdom should
be prepared to lead efforts in the U.N. Security Council to im-
pose immediate and specific measures against any government,
militia or rebel official who obstructs the deployment of the hy-
brid force, undermines the forward movement of the peace pro-
cess or is responsible for attacks against civilian populations. Ad-
ditional assistance should also be given to the ICC to execute
indictments, support the prosecution of those indicted, and help
accelerate the Court's preparation of additional cases against se-
nior Sudanese officials responsible for crimes against humanity.
The United States should also consult with the U.N., E.U. and
A.U. about strategies for apprehending indictees so prosecutions
can begin. Activists must continue to ramp up advocacy efforts
aimed at pressuring China in the build-up to the Olympics, in-
cluding intensified divestment focused on Chinese companies.
CONCLUSION
Change takes time. In social and political movements
throughout history-be it the civil rights movement in the
United States, the anti-apartheid movement in South Africa, or
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worldwide efforts to end colonialism and slavery in Africa and
elsewhere-gains were rarely instantaneous or immediately tan-
gible. But with time and momentum, they achieved what most
people during those eras believed to be unachievable. Similarly,
most experts saw no end in sight for the horrific wars plaguing
Liberia, Sierra Leone, Angola, and Burundi ten years ago. To-
day those countries are at peace, growing economically, and
healing the scars of the past. With the help of a movement that
is getting larger and smarter as time progresses, Sudan, too, can
join the ranks of the many post-conflict countries in Africa and
around the world.
